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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JOHN O'DONNELL, RUTHANN HILLAND, and MICHELE DE SCISCIOLO for themselves and a class of consumers similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

KRAFT FOODS, INC., manufacturer of the Oscar Mayer brand; SARA LEE CORPORATION, manufacturer of the Ball Park brand; CONAGRA FOODS, INC., manufacturer of the Hebrew National brand; NATHAN'S FAMOUS, INC., manufacturer of the Nathan's Famous brand; and MARATHON ENTERPRISES, INC., manufacturer of the Sabrett brand,

Defendants.

Hon. Jose L. Linares, U.S.D.J.

Civil Action No. 09 Civ. 04448 (JLL-CCC)

CERTIFICATION OF JOHN D.
TORTORELLA IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION TO
DISMISS THE COMPLAINT

JOHN D. TORTORELLA, of full age, certifies and states:

1. I am an attorney at law in the State of New Jersey, and a member of the firm of Marino, Tortorella & Boyle, P.C., attorneys for Defendant Kraft Foods, Inc. ("Kraft"). I submit

this Certification in support of Defendants' joint Motion to Dismiss the Complaint.

2. Attached as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of an order entered by Hon. Jamie

D. Happas, dismissing the complaint in DeBenedetto v. Denny's, Inc., MID-L-6259-09 (N.J.

Super. Law Div.) without prejudice on November 10, 2009.

3. Attached as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of the transcript containing Judge

Happas's opinion in DeBenedetto v. Denny's, Inc., MID-L-6259-09 (N.J. Super. Law Div. Nov.

10, 2009).

I certify under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746(2), that the foregoing is

JOHN D. TORTORE

true and correct.

Dated: November 24, 2009

EXHIBIT 1

3

PORZIO, BROMBERG & NEWMAN, P.C.

100 Southgate Parkway Morristown, NJ 07962-1997 (973) 538-4006 Attorneys for Defendant Denny's, Inc. FILED

NOV 1 0 2009

Judge Jamie D. Happas

NICK DeBENEDETTO on behalf of himself and those similarly situated,

Plaintiff(s),

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION: MIDDLESEX COUNTY

DOCKET NO.: MID-L-6259-09 CIVIL ACTION

v.

DENNY'S, INC.,

Defendant.

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE

THIS MATTER having been opened to the Court upon application by Porzio, Bromberg & Newman, P.C., attorneys for the Defendant, Denny's, Inc., and the Court having read and reviewed the moving papers submitted and any opposition thereto and for good cause having been shown;

It is on this 10 day of 100, , 2009,

ORDERED that the motion of Defendant, Denny's, Inc., to dismiss's hereby granted; and

FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

A copy of the within Order shall be served upon all counsel within ______ days from the date of entry.

JAMIE D. HAPPAS J.S.C.

J.S.C.

A Forthe reasons set Perty

it is

	The court made the attached findings of fact or reasons for its decision on							
	The court set forth its findings of fact or reasons for its decision orally on the record on							
							•	
This	Motion was:							
X.	Opposed							
(Unopposed							

On this date, pursuant to R. 1:6-2 The court's statement of reasons have been set forth on the record. EXHIBIT 2

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION, CIVIL PART MIDDLESEX COUNTY DOCKET NO. L-6259-09 APP. DIV. NO.

DeBENEDETTO,

Plaintiff,

TRANSCRIPT

MOTION

vs.

OF

DENNY'S,

Defendant. :

Place: Middlesex County Courthouse

56 Paterson Street

New Brunswick, NJ 08903

Date:

November 10, 2009

BEFORE:

HONORABLE JAMIE D. HAPPAS, J.S.C.

TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY:

LAUREN E. HANDLER, ESQ., (Porzio, Bromberg, and Newman, PC, PO Box 1997, 100 Southgate Parkway, Morristown, New Jersey 07960-6441)

APPEARANCES:

ANDREW R. WOLF, ESQ., (Galex Wolf, LLC) HENRY P. WOLFE, ESQ., (Galex Wolf, LLC) MICHAEL QUIRK, ESQ., Attorneys for the Plaintiff

LAUREN E. HANDLER, ESQ., (Porzio, Bromberg, and Newman, PC)
JANE THORPE, ESQ., (Alston and Bird, LLP)
Attorneys for Defendant

Transcriber:

Susan M. Cawley,

AD/T #427

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Colloquy
                                                                 3
 1
                      (Matter commences, 1:30 p.m.)
 2
                  THE COURT: Good afternoon.
 3
                  MS. HANDLER: Good afternoon.
 4
                  MR. WOLF: Good afternoon, Judge.
 5
                  THE COURT: Everybody's on time, this is
                        This is <u>DeBENEDETTO VS. DENNY'S</u>, enter
 6
        great.
                Okay.
 7
        your appearance, please.
 8
                  MS. THORPE:
                                Jane Thorpe for Denny's, Your
 9
        Honor.
10
                  MS. HANDLER:
                                 Lauren Handler; Porzio,
11
        Bromberg, and Newman, for Denny's.
12
                  MR. WOLF: Good afternoon, Your Honor, Andrew
        Wolf from Galax Wolf on behalf of DeBenedetto.
13
14
        like to introduce to the Court Michael Quirk
15
        (phonetic), --
16
                  THE COURT:
                               Very good.
17
                              -- from Pennsylvania, who was just
                  MR. WOLF:
18
        admitted pro hac --
19
                  THE COURT:
                               Very good.
20
                  MR. WOLF: -- by Your Honor.
                  THE COURT: Nice to see you, Mr. Quirk.
21
22
                  MR. WOLF:
                              And another associate from my
23
        firm, Henry Wolfe, is here.
24
                  THE COURT: Okay.
                                     Very good.
                                                   This is Wolfe
25
        but not related, right?
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Colloquy / The Court - Case History
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MR. WOLF: Right. Different spelling.
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THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WOLF: Well, he's -- I still have to sign things, like his paycheck, but.

THE COURT: Oh, okay. Maybe that's -- maybe that's why he's seated in the back, right?

MR. WOLFE: He gives me my allowance.

THE COURT: There you go. All right. Let me -- how I normally hear the motions, and I know -- I'm not sure, Mr. Wolf, if you -- you've had motions before me.

MR. WOLF: No, I've had case management --

THE COURT: No. Case management.

MR. WOLF: -- settlement conference, --

THE COURT: Okay. What I -- MR. WOLF: -- not a motion.

THE COURT: -- normally do is, I place on the record the facts, as I glean them to be, from reading -- excuse me, from reading the papers, I then have some questions, and I'll let you all argue, and we can do our thing.

All right. July 22nd, 2009, plaintiff, Nick DeBenedetto filed a class action lawsuit against Denny's, alleging that defendant violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act in breaching implied warranty

The Court - Case History

of merchantability by serving meals containing large and undisclosed amounts of sodium.

Specifically, plaintiff claims that Denny's engaged in deceptive and unconscionable commercial practice in its sales of meals containing alarmingly large and undisclosed amounts of sodium. Plaintiff further alleges that he was a customer at Denny's for 10 to 20 years and ate at Denny's approximately 10 times -- 10 times in 12 months before filing this complaint.

Plaintiff alleges an ascertainable loss equal to the amount of money he spent on meals containing high and undisclosed sodium content.

Defendant Denny's now moves to dismiss the complaint, contending that -- contending that plaintiff has failed to state the claim on -- on which relief can be granted.

The movant's argument, in summary, is defendant argues that plaintiff's complaint fails because New Jersey's Product's Liability Act provides the exclusive cause of action for plaintiffs, who, like plaintiff, have a claim on an allegedly defective product.

Moreover, because plaintiff is not alleging physical harm, as required by the PLA, his suit fails

The Court - Case History

in its entirety. Further, plaintiff's action under the Consumer Fraud Act and implied warranty claim are equally deficient, even assuming those apply here.

With respect to the CFA, which is the Consumer Fraud Act, plaintiff cannot establish that Denny's engaged in unlawful conduct by failing to disclose an open and obvious condition of its food.

And plaintiff's theory of ascertainable loss, the purchase price of his meals, fails, because plaintiff received and consumed exactly what was promised. Having failed to allege that he made any effort to, actually, learn the sodium content of Denny's food, the information which was available on Denny's website.

Plaintiff fails to establish the causal link between the alleged unlawful conduct and the ascertainable loss required to state a claim under the CFA.

For similar reasons, plaintiff's claim fails -- plaintiff fails to state a claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability, which requires not only that the food be fit for ordinary purposes -- which requires only that the food be fit for ordinary purposes.

Having alleged that he returned to Denny's

The Court - Case History

ten times within a year, plaintiff cannot reasonably claim that Denny's food was not fit for ordinary purposes. Accordingly, Denny's moves to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The plaintiff believes the restaurant should be required to lower the sodium content of their foods or print some type of notice to customers about sodium. The remedy is in the legislature and not the courts.

The Court received opposition and the opposition, in summary, sets forth that plaintiff agrees with defendant, that this lawsuit was not an effort to recover damages for injuries. Rather, it's an effort to enjoin defendant's unlawful practice of concealing the astronomical amounts of salt in many of its meals from customers at the point of purchase.

This is why plaintiff sued defendant under the CFA for individual refund and class-wide injunctive relief. The PLA has nothing to do with this case and Denny's argument that the PLA subsumes or preempts plaintiff's claims is a legally baseless ruse designed to strip consumers of their legal rights and remedies, while allowing Denny's and other purveyors of marketable food products to continue their unlawful conduct, concealing material information about these

The Court - Case History

products from consumers at the point of sale.

Further, defendant's admitted complaint alleges sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case under the CFA. Specifically, plaintiff has sufficiently pled unlawful practices, ascertainable loss, and causation with respect to the first prong of the types of unlawful practices recognized under the CFA. Only knowing admissions require the consumer to completely establish intent.

By contrast, CFA regulatory and supplemented provisions prescribe a specific conduct, a per se unlawful practices. The amended complaint easily establishes unlawful practices by Denny's, including unlawful practices that violate CFA regulatory provisions.

With respect to the second prong, ascertainable loss, the complaint does -- does specify an ascertainable loss in the amount of money that plaintiff paid for meals at Denny's. The purchase of which were induced by Denny's unlawful practices of concealment. The purchase price of goods is a proximate measure of loss when a consumer, as the result of the seller's unlawful practice, received something different from what he bargained, and thus, never actually gets what he bargained for.

The Court - Case History

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Finally -- finally, with respect to causation, the amended complaint alleges that, "Mr. DeBenedetto would not have purchased Moons over My Hammy or any other high sodium meal if the menus had clearly stated the sodium content." The law is clear that this satisfies a plaintiff's pleading requirement for the third element of a CFA cause of action.

In addition, plaintiff contends that Denny's breached the implied warranty of merchantability, because its meals are prepared with excessive amounts of sodium and are not adequately described on the menu as to advise plaintiff and the New Jersey consumers that they are consuming high amounts of sodium in one meal, that are in excess of the advised daily limit.

Denny's meals are not fit to be consumed, based on expert's conclusions, including that of the American Heart Association, American Stroke Association, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Academy of Science, National Institutes of Health, US Department of Health and Human Services, and US Department of Agriculture.

The high amounts of sodium in foods, such as the high amounts of sodium in Denny's meals, can lead to hypertension.

Moreover, plaintiff -- moreover, plaintiff

discredits defendant's characterization their food is merchantable, but is palatable, it causes no immediate harm. Not everyone exposed to a contaminant will suffer from it, but that does not excuse contamination.

Ultimately, the high sodium content in Denny's food renders defendant's meals unmerchantable, because they are not of fair and average quality, not fit for ordinary purpose of human consumption, and not adequately described on menus to advise plaintiff and New Jersey consumers that the meals contain high -- high levels of sodium.

The Court received a reply. Plaintiff's response in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss failed to overcome the settled law that both New Jersey and courts in other jurisdiction facing similar claims that require the dismissal is, actually, its entirety.

The reply also sets forth that plaintiff's reiteration of large portions of the complaint cannot change the fact that his theory of liability is fundamentally a product's liability action, because the alleged economic harm arises entirely from the potential for personal, physical illness, he suggests, could result from his consumption of the product at issue, food purchased at Denny's.

In New Jersey, product's liability actions

The Court - Case History

of food are potentially unhealthy to the people

must be brought pursuant to the PLA, as the PLA subsumes product's liability claims purportedly brought pursuant to the CFA. The PLA requires physical harm, which plaintiff, expressly, disavowed. So both of his

which plaintiff, expressly, disavowed. So both of his claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

With respect to the CFA, plaintiff simply ignores the multiple cases dismissing similar claims based on the open and obvious fact that various types

consuming them.

In this case, plaintiff does not dispute that people are aware of the presence of sodium in food and, in fact, admits to knowledge that it could affect his health. Instead, plaintiff argues that the widespread commonsense knowledge about sodium knowledge, plaintiff does not dispute. Does not require the dismissal of his claims. It is, in essence, relevant to the question of whether Denny's engaged in unlawful conduct by withholding that very information.

Plaintiff, on the one hand, asked the Court to ignore the public knowledge about sodium in food when addressing the question of Denny's unlawful conduct. Where as, on the other hand, plaintiff bases his claim of ascertainable loss on the public's

3 4 5

undefined reasonable expectations as to the sodium content of Denny's food.

The plaintiff has not alleged any facts in his complaint demonstrating that plaintiff or consumers either, actually, believe that Denny's food adhere to various recommendations regarding the sodium intake or have some other reasonable basis for such relief.

For similar reasons, plaintiff has not stated the breach of implied warranty of merchantability claim, because that warranty merely requires that the food be fit for ordinary purposes. Having alleged that he returned to Denny's 10 times within a year, and visited Denny's for 10 to 20 years, plaintiff cannot now reasonably claim that Denny's food was not fit for ordinary purposes.

If I misstated something, thoroughly, I'd suggest that you clarify the record, but before you start to argue, let me ask some questions and then you can argue whatever I may have missed. There's no need for you to reiterate what I've already set forth on the record. I've read the papers a couple times. So there's no need to reiterate what I've already read. If you want to stress a point, that's fine.

But I've got a couple questions, first, for the plaintiff. Assuming -- and who's going to argue

Wolf - Motion

the case?

MR. WOLF: I will, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And that doesn't preclude you if you want say something, I just don't want you both arguing back and forth, then it's two against one.

MR. WOLFE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Assuming that you were alleging an injury or increased risk of injury, I know that's not what you're contending here, but let's assume, for argument sake, that you were, do you agree that the implied warranty of merchantability would be subsumed by the PLA, as well as the CFA claim?

MR. WOLF: With that assumption, yes. I --

MR. WOLF: Well, that's -- I'm just -- I'm -- I'm used to standing up, especially --

THE COURT: -- some lawyers want to stand, but I don't mind you -- you can sit up and sit down, whatever --

MR. WOLF: -- the first time before a judge, I --

THE COURT: What -- whatever, but -- I know, that's -- as I normally say, that's because Judge --

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1
                  MR. WOLF: Well, the --
 2
                  THE COURT: -- Rodriquez is looking at you.
 3
                              It -- it -- but that's an
                  MR. WOLF:
 4
                    And -- and just to -- to finish it, that
 5
        -- that's not in our complaint. We haven't alleged --
 6
                  THE COURT:
                               Oh, I know that.
 7
                  MR. WOLF:
                             And we --
 8
                  THE COURT: And it's -- I'm just -- just
        assuming a fact you vehemently object to.
 9
                             Right. And -- and we, actually,
10
                  MR. WOLF:
11
        read, you know, <u>SINCLAIR</u>, <u>McDARBY</u>, and that before we
12
        filed.
13
                  THE COURT:
                              I'm sure you did.
14
                  MR. WOLF:
                             The -- so we -- we --
15
                  THE COURT: I would hope that you did.
16
                  MR. WOLF: And so we -- we're aware of the
17
        pitfalls of a --
18
                  THE COURT: Uh-huh.
19
                  MR. WOLF:
                             -- PLA action and we're also aware
20
        that the Consumer Fraud Act has specific provisions
21
        that prescribe this type of conduct. There's a Truth
22
        in Menu Act provision. There -- and --
23
                  THE COURT: Uh-huh.
                  MR. WOLF:
24
                              -- so that's what we pled on.
25
                  THE COURT: Okay. Now, do you agree or
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Wolf - Motion

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1
        disagree -- or do you agree that if Mr. DeBenedetto
 2
        were to continue to eat at Denny's, with no knowledge
 3
        of the sodium intake, because nothing was posted,
 4
        although I know there's an allegation it's posted in --
 5
        it's not an allegation, I went on the website to see
 6
        that it is posted, but do you agree that if Mr.
 7
        DeBenedetto were to continue to eat at Denny's with no
 8
        knowledge of the sodium intake, that this could,
 9
        ultimately, impact on his hypertension and high blood
10
        pressure condition?
11
                  MR. WOLF: I -- I -- I can't agree with that,
12
        because --
13
                  THE COURT: You can't agree.
14
                  MR. WOLF:
                             I -- well, I -- I don't know.
15
                              I just didn't hear you, no, I
                  THE COURT:
16
        didn't.
17
                  MR. WOLF:
                             I -- I can't agree with that
18
        statement as --
19
                  THE COURT: You can or you can't.
20
                  MR. WOLF:
                             Cannot.
21
                  THE COURT:
                              Okay.
22
                  MR. WOLF:
                             Because I'm not sure that that has
23
        any impact on -- I mean, he has -- I don't know if he
24
        goes home and drinks four gallons of water.
25
        the point --
```

```
1
                  THE COURT: Well --
 2
                  MR. WOLF: -- of our case. It may, at some
 3
        point, have an impact on his health, it may not.
        not a part of his cause of action, --
 4
 5
                  THE COURT:
                              Well --
 6
                  MR. WOLF:
                            -- it's not part of his claims.
 7
                  THE COURT: Well, the complaint -- do you
 8
        agree -- would you agree that he's aware that he should
 9
        be on a low sodium diet?
10
                  MR. WOLF:
                            We are aware that he, personally,
        has knowledge of the fact that he --
11
                  THE COURT: So the answer's yes or no.
12
13
                  MR. WOLF:
                             Yes, --
14
                  THE COURT:
                              Okay.
15
                  MR. WOLF:
                             -- to that question only.
16
                  THE COURT: Are you aware that -- that he
17
        watches his salt intake?
                  MR. WOLF:
18
                             Yes, we are aware of that, Your
19
        Honor.
20
                  THE COURT: And are you aware that he looks
21
        for low sodium menu items --
22
                  MR. WOLF:
                             I -- I believe we pled that.
23
                  THE COURT: Let me finish my --
24
                  MR. WOLF:
                             Sorry, Your Honor.
25
                  THE COURT: -- let me finish my -- my
```

Wolf - Motion

```
statement. Are you aware that he looks for low sodium
 1
 2
        menu items when eating at restaurants?
 3
                  MR. WOLF: I'm not sure if we pled it exactly
 4
        that way, Your Honor, but I believe he -- he doesn't
 5
        use salt on his food and he -- what he -- when there is
 6
        information, he buys lower or less --
 7
                  THE COURT: You pled it --
 8
                  MR. WOLF:
                             -- sodium.
                  THE COURT:
                              -- that way, because --
 9
10
                  MR. WOLF: Right.
11
                  THE COURT: -- that's where I got it from.
12
                  MR. WOLF:
                             Okay.
                  THE COURT:
                              So I didn't make it up.
13
                  MR. WOLF: Okay. Yes.
14
15
                  THE COURT:
                              So we can -- we can assume all of
16
        those things, because that's in your pleading, correct?
17
                  MR. WOLF:
                             Right.
                  THE COURT:
18
                              How can you then assert that
19
        plaintiff's claims do not involve a risk of injury?
20
                  MR. WOLF: He hasn't alleged any risk of
21
        injury --
22
                  THE COURT: But given what you've --
23
                  MR. WOLF:
                             -- and he's not looking for --
                  THE COURT: -- set forth in your complaint,
24
25
        how could you then assert that although you didn't --
```

you didn't plead it, okay, but making and setting forth those contentions and allegations in your complaint, how could you then set forth before this Court that plaintiff's claims had nothing to do, when they're not involved with any risk of injury?

MR. WOLF: Because that's -- I -- our understanding of the law and the Consumer Fraud Act and the specific Truth and Menu provisions are that there's an obligation under 56:8-2.9, 10, and 11, for the defendant to have put forth on their menus. So the fact that -- that's -- our claim is, purely, an economic claim. Whether --

THE COURT: I understand that.

MR. WOLF: -- or not he has risk or injury -THE COURT: I understand that, but we have to
take a look at the law. Your -- your -- as it's set
out, you state that it's just economic loss. Okay.
But if you -- what I -- what I need to do, when I look
at a complaint, and in the future we can attach
complaints, because I've gotten a lot of motions
dismissed, but -- but complaints aren't attached, but I
got the complaint. That's totally on point. So I -it was easy for me to get. Not so easy sometimes when
it's not my file, but I have the complaint and it's my
duty to go through the complaint with a fine tooth comb

Wolf - Motion

and to ascertain whether it does state a cause of action.

Now, my concern, at least, is that you -- you have a whole section in your complaint and you tell me a little bit about Mr. DeBendetto (sic) -- DeBenedetto, and you tell me about the facts about him, and I set forth some of those things on the record, but in your argument, you state that these claims have nothing to do with any involvement with risk of injury, correct?

MR. WOLF: That's correct, Your Honor, and -- and they -- the -- the information about sodium and about Mr. DeBenedetto's individual claims, those are background facts. They're not the allegations.

Now, if -- if you think that those are important to the pleading, then we can re-plead it and take those out, because they're not part of our claim, they were just there to give everybody, defendants, everybody background on the claim, but I think it's important --

THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask my questions, and then you can argue anything you want.

MR. WOLF: All right.

THE COURT: Let me get through so I can

have --

MR. WOLF: Okay.

THE COURT: -- a good understanding. Does the consumption of Denny's meals with the alleged, and I'm using the word astronomical, because that's -- I either got it from your complaint or your opposition, but does the consumption of Denny's meal with the alleged astronomical sodium content, have any physical appect (sic) upon -- any physical affect upon the plaintiff or those similarly situated?

MR. WOLF: Not to my knowledge that it has an

THE COURT: Then why do you then argue that -- and I set forth in your -- my recitation of your opposition, that there was all those different organizations that say that high sodium intake could affect -- could affect somebody?

MR. WOLF: Those are potential harms, which we believe, based on the high sodium contact (sic) in Denny's foods, would require them, under the Consumer Fraud Act, the Truth in Menu provisions, to disclose that information so that people would have a choice on whether or not to purchase those items, based on their own personal knowledge of preferences.

THE COURT: So you're contending that plaintiff's CFA claim is based purely on economic losses. Is that correct?

Wolf - Motion

MR. WOLF: That is correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And does the fact that the
federal government is now dealing with this issue of
posting ingredients in food, does that, in any way,
preempt this Court from dealing with this issue?

MR. WOLF: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Why?

MR. WOLF: Well -- well, what if -- if you're talking about the federal --

THE COURT: I'm -- I'm -- specifically, I did some research and there's two -- there's, actually, two bills that are -- that are pending in Washington. One, I think, is the Meal -- the Meal Act, and there's another one that, specifically, deals with the posting of ingredients, including sodium.

MR. WOLF: Well, at this point in time, there are bills pending in Congress and -- and I -- I'm not 100 percent, I know there was some references to some pending legislation or on past legislation in Denny's papers, but the fact that there's no law, specifically, preempting or in place at this time, would not prevent us from proceeding with this claim at this time.

If there's a preemption and then there's a retroactive --if -- if -- if a statute was, ultimately, passed or a regulation, generally, they have

affect.

Some of my

1 perspective applicability and then we could deal with 2 whether or not there's a retroactive applicability of 3 that, but as I know now, there's no -- no statute or 4 regulation in place that --5 THE COURT: Are you aware of --6 MR. WOLF: -- deals with that. 7 THE COURT: -- those bills that are pending 8 in DC? 9 I, personally, am not. MR. WOLF: 10 co-counsel might be aware of them. 11 THE COURT: Are you aware of them? 12 MR. QUIRK: It might be torturing the definition of awareness to say yes, but I -- yeah, I 13 14 saw something in the paper about something connected 15 with one of the -- possibly connected with the health 16 care legislation.

THE COURT: Wouldn't it be important to know that stuff? I -- I -- I was curious --

MR. WOLF: Well --

THE COURT: -- to know whether or not there was anything pending, because we all know what's going on in California, in New York, in the various states. And then when I found out and I duq a little bit deeper, I found that there was, actually, two bills pending in -- in -- in Washington, and they're getting

Wolf - Motion

23

a little bit closer in terms of whether or not that they're going to pass or -- or not pass, but that's okay, that's -- that's neither here nor there. We don't have --

> MR. WOLF: They're not --

THE COURT: -- we don't have to get hung up

on that.

MR. WOLF: Yeah.

THE COURT: What was the unlawful conduct

here?

MR. WOLF: The --

THE COURT: Know -- knowing that there's -there's legislation -- federal legislation now out there, knowing that there's nothing in New Jersey that says that you have to post the sodium content in menus. What's the unlawful conduct?

MR. WOLF: Well, Your Honor, actually, this -- the fact that there's no specific legislation or law in New Jersey that says you have to post calories or salt on a menu, is not the question. The question is that -- and one of the reasons why those laws might not have passed, is because the Consumer Fraud Act, actually, covers that.

The -- the Consumer Fraud Act has a Truth in Menu provision that requires to put things that are

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truthful on the menu and not to omit things that you know that are misrepresentations.

THE COURT: But you, actually, have something, I think, that's in your complaint or some -- something that was cited -- one of those articles that were cited, that -- really, that -- that -- that tells us that restaurants are, actually, exempt from doing -- from --

MR. WOLF: Well --

THE COURT: -- from certain aspects of,

actually, posting.

MR. WOLF: Well, that's not true, Your Honor. I -- I think there's, like, New York has a -- a fast food law, something that requires them to do it, but the law in New Jersey, as far as I understand it, is very clear, 56:8-2.9, N.J.S.A., certainly, says that it shall be an unlawful practice for any person to misrepresent on any menu or posted information, including advertisements, the identity of any food or food products to any of the patrons or customers of eating establish (sic), including, but not limited to restaurants, hotels, cafes, lunch counters, and other places where food is regularly prepared and sold for consumption, on or off premises. So it doesn't apply to retail foods.

Wolf - Motion

And then the next section of that statute, which is 56:8-2.10 defines what a misrepresentation is. The identity of such food or food products shall be deemed misrepresented if A, its description is false or misleading in any particular, but more importantly, B, its description omits information, which by its omission, renders the description false or maleading (sic) -- misleading in any particular.

And our claim is that the fact that they know that they have this high sodium content in their food and they don't advise people of it, is a omission and a misrepresentation by law, under this statute. And that there's -- we don't need to go any further, we don't need to look at intent or anything else, that this is pure --

THE COURT: So the statute -- MR. WOLF: -- statutory claim.

THE COURT: -- that you cite, you state that that requires Denny (sic) to identify -- Denny's, as well as every single fast food restaurant, as well as every single restaurant that -- that anyone eats at in New Jersey, to identify the sodium content of its food on its menu.

MR. WOLF: No, Your Honor, --THE COURT: Okay. Then --

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                             -- that's not my argument.
                  MR. WOLF:
 2
                  THE COURT: -- what's your argument?
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                  MR. WOLF:
                             My argument is -- is, if it's so
 4
        outside of what expectations and the norm is, like, if
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        you go -- if I go to every --
 6
                  THE COURT:
                              Who's going to determine what's
 7
        outside the expectations, --
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                  MR. WOLF:
                             Well, --
 9
                  THE COURT:
                              -- me?
                             -- there's standards out there.
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                  MR. WOLF:
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                  THE COURT: Me.
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                  MR. WOLF:
                             Well -- not on -- this is a motion
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        to dismiss, it's not --
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                  THE COURT: Oh, I know, --
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                  MR. WOLF: -- summary judgment.
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                  THE COURT: -- but I'm curious, who --
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                  MR. WOLF: All right. What -- what --
                  THE COURT:
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                              -- whose -- whose going to be
19
        asked to decide that?
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                  MR. WOLF:
                             Well, when -- when the -- it's --
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        every -- it's funny that you ask that question, because
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        I -- I had the same thought as Your Honor.
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                  THE COURT: Well, there you go.
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                  MR. WOLF: Okay. And -- and here's what I
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        did, is I -- I went -- you know, every bagel place,
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Wolf - Motion

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every breakfast place in New Jersey, and New Jersey is famous for pork roll, egg, and cheese on a roll, right. Did -- and every place serves a ham, egg, and cheese sandwich, but my expectations and about the 50 people that I spoke to over the last few weeks, when I said, when you go in and you order that ham, egg, and cheese sandwich at the local bagel store or the deli or the coffee shop, and you eat it, what are your expectations?

He goes, well, I know I'm probably not eating the best breakfast that I can, but I watch myself. And what if I told -- you know, and you talk to the proprietors, no we just use regular slice of ham and cheese. Well, there's probably about maybe 800, 900 milligrams of salt in our food.

You don't expect to have two and a half times your daily allotment of salt in a product when the person knows that it's in there. And that's --

THE COURT: Yeah, but any time you walk -- MR. WOLF: -- what we're saying --

THE COURT: -- outside of your house and you walk into any restaurant or into any fast food, aren't you taking it upon your own hands as to what you're putting into your body? That doesn't even matter.

MR. WOLF: I -- I --

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                  THE COURT: You know what, --
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                  MR. WOLF: -- I don't think --
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                  THE COURT: -- don't even answer that,
 4
        because --
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                  MR. WOLF:
                             Yeah.
 6
                  THE COURT:
                             -- we're -- it doesn't matter, --
 7
                  MR. WOLF: And -- and --
 8
                  THE COURT: -- in terms of this motion, --
                  MR. WOLF: Right, these -- these are --
 9
                  THE COURT: -- it doesn't matter.
10
                                                     We don't
11
        have to get there.
12
                  MR. WOLF:
                             -- factual issues that we might
13
        have to resolve --
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                  THE COURT: No, it just -- I'm just curious.
15
                  MR. WOLF: -- in the case, yeah.
                                                    Yeah, but
16
        -- but --
17
                  THE COURT:
                              There's no reason for us to even
18
        get into it.
19
                  MR. WOLF: -- but I -- I think that, you
        know, the -- the issue is, really, one of -- of what
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        they know and what would render -- what's omitted from
        their menu that they know. They know, they have it
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        hidden on their website, you can't expect people to go
24
        look at websites before they eat, they know that
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        they're foods have two, three, some four times the
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Wolf - Motion

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daily recommendations for sodium.
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THE COURT: Okay. I -- I understand that. MR. WOLF: And that's our argument that it's misrepresentation. Whether or not we succeed on the merits of the case, that -- that's something that we should find out later on.

THE COURT: I understand that. In fact, you -- but there's a report, and I don't have the name right here, but there is a report cited in your complaint that notes that restaurants are exempt from posting this information.

MR. WOLF: I -- I --

THE COURT: May -- maybe you can help me.

MS. HANDLER: It's the Nutrition Education

Labeling Act, and it --

THE COURT: Right, because I -- because I -- MS. HANDLER: -- says we don't have to --

THE COURT: Right.

MS. HANDLER: -- to do it. And I -- I have

the cite, Your Honor, which --

THE COURT: Okay. No, I just -- I -- I

thought I read that someplace. It's -- it's in their complaint.

Now, I mean, are you asking since -- I guess -- are you asking the Court to create a -- a new

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requirement then that all restaurants to close -disclose sodium contact -- content in their menus,
which are higher than they should be?

MR. WOLF: I -- I don't think so, Your Honor.
I don't think -THE COURT: But what are you asking -- what
are you asking --

MR. WOLF: We're asking, in this case, to proceed on a case against Denny's, to show that they knew that they had high sodium, that they had an obligation, under New Jersey law, to -- to do that. The -- the other cases before us or before the court, we know, in this case, that Denny's was aware of their high sodium content. They were aware that they did it, and that they -- they refused to put it on their menu, and that there's a law that says if you know that there's things that are going to affect people's thought process in buying it, you have to tell people about it.

So it's the same thing as if -THE COURT: But that would -- that would
affect every single fast food restaurant. I mean, you
-- your -- you, yourself, just cited a couple of them.
I mean, I think you had McDonald's, you had a couple
other ones just --

Wolf - Motion

MR. WOLF: Well -THE COURT: -- cited in your complaint.

MR. WOLF: It -- it may have that affect, but -- but that's the law. I mean, we're -- all we're doing is seeking to have the law of New Jersey apply to Denny's at this point. I'm not making a public policy, it might have -- ultimately, have that affect, but -- but that -- that -- that ultimate issue, I don't think is before --

THE COURT: And why -- and --

MR. WOLF: -- the Court.

THE COURT: -- and then what's the importance

of that?

MR. WOLF: Well -- well, let's --

THE COURT: What's the importance of -- of -- of bringing that to the Court to do -- to -- for that reason?

MR. WOLF: Well --

THE COURT: What's the -- what's the importance of bringing that to the Court's attention?

MR. WOLF: I'm -- I'm sorry, what -- because we have a plaintiff that feels that he's been aggrieved under the Consumer Fraud Act and he -- he, virtually, says, I wouldn't buy this and they should have let me know, and the law in New Jersey says it.

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Wolf - Motion
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                  THE COURT: And --
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                  MR. WOLF:
                             Let -- let's say, for example --
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                  THE COURT: And why wouldn't he buy it?
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                  MR. WOLF:
                             He, personally, would make a
 5
        choice --
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                  THE COURT:
                              Right.
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                  MR. WOLF:
                             -- for probably many reasons.
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                  THE COURT: So what's some of the reasons?
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                  MR. WOLF:
                             I don't know. I -- personally,
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        me, I used to eat at Denny's, I won't eat there any
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        more.
               Not --
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                  THE COURT:
                              Well --
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                  MR. WOLF:
                            -- I don't have a problem with my
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        salt --
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                  THE COURT: He wouldn't eat there, because --
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        because of the health reasons, correct?
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                  MR. WOLF: Well --
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                  THE COURT: That's what you have in your --
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                  MR. WOLF:
                             That's one of --
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                  THE COURT:
                             -- complaint.
21
                  MR. WOLF: -- his reasons.
22
                  THE COURT: Yes, that's the
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                  MR. WOLF: He also just --
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                  THE COURT:
                              -- reason you have in your
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        complaint. There's no --
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Wolf - Motion

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MR. WOLF: All right. Well --
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                  THE COURT: -- other reason you have in your
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        complaint, correct? The harm that he would -- that he
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        would sustain, because of consuming this, is the reason
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        why he wouldn't eat it. Is that fair? Am I -- that's
 6
        -- that's what I read from your complaint.
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                             I -- I -- I think we gave
                  MR. WOLF:
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        that as background information. He would make a
        personal choice not to eat that much sodium.
 9
                                                      Whether
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        or not he would be harmed by it in the future, he's
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        been told to watch his salt intake, but I -- I'm not --
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        been told to do that, I watch my salt intake.
                  THE COURT: Do you dispute that the
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14
        consumptions of Denny meal -- Denny's meals can cause
15
        physical harm to consumers?
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                  MR. WOLF:
                             Do I dispute that?
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                  THE COURT:
                              Yeah.
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                  MR. WOLF:
                             That there's a potential for that?
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                  THE COURT: Yeah.
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                  MR. WOLF: I -- I think there's -- the Court
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        can take judicial notice of all the reports that we
22
        cited, that the high --
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                  THE COURT:
                              That's not my -- that's not my
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                   I'm not -- I'm not --
        question.
                  MR. WOLF:
                             That --
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1 THE COURT: -- my question's not whether or 2 not I can take judicial notice. My question is, do you 3 dispute that the consumption of Denny's meals can cause 4 physical harm to a consumer? 5 MR. WOLF: Do I dispute that? 6 THE COURT: Yeah. 7 MR. WOLF: On a particular consumer that 8 might have a propensity towards problems --9 THE COURT: In -- in general. 10 MR. WOLF: -- with salt intake --THE COURT: 11 In general, if someone were to go 12 in there and eat My -- I can never get that right. 13 MR. QUIRK: Moons over My Hammy. 14 THE COURT: Moons over My Hammy, do you 15 dispute that that can have some type of physical 16 harm --17 I -- I -- I don't --MR. WOLF: 18 -- if someone were to continually THE COURT: 19 eat that, without knowing the sodium content? I -- I --20 MR. WOLF: And given all the reports that 21 THE COURT: 22 you've -- that you've cited in your complaint. 23 MR. WOLF: I -- I -- I'm -- you know, I'd 24 have to think about that. I -- I'm -- I want to be 25 frank with the Court, but I don't know if I dispute it

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I know that under the law of New Jersey, people are supposed to be given the choice on the menus of what they --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WOLF: -- do consume.

THE COURT: I understand that, but you're --

but --

MR. WOLF: And -- and that -- that -- like my father, when he sits down to eat a meal, and he's supposed to watch his sodium in his own diet, he has high blood pressure and he's 82 years old, he sits down and the first thing he does, he picks up the salt shaker and he shakes food on -- salt on his food before he even tastes it -- tastes it. And that's a personal choice that he makes whether to listen to his doctor or whether it's going to hurt him or not.

And I don't think that's -- that's not the point of our case. The point is, there might be some potential harm, but the point is that this is about purely economic marketing and -- and what are supposed to be disclosed. And the Consumer Fraud Act, specifically, prescribes this behavior, that they -- if they know things about their food, they're supposed to disclose it on their menus.

And then the person has the choice whether to

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consume it, whether he's going to die from it, whether he's going to have a heart attack, whether he's going to have to take three more high blood pressure pills. That becomes a personal choice, but it's not what our case is about.

THE COURT: But why does your -- why -- why do you then -- I mean, your opposition sets forth that Denny's meals are not fit to be consumed, based on experts' conclusions, including that of the American Heart Association, American Stroke Association, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Academy of Science, National Institutes of Health, US Department of Health and Human Services, and US Department of Agriculture.

The high amounts of sodium in foods, such as the high amounts of sodium in Denny's meals, can lead to hypertension. That's what you're arguing.

MR. WOLF: Well, that's --

THE COURT: I -- I didn't get that -- I got

that either from your -- your --

MR. WOLF: But -- oh -- that's in our complaint, because it's background information and it's not a part of our claims. It's -- it's background information. It's not what we're pleading and it's not what our case is about.

Wolf - Motion

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THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WOLF: And if you want us to re-plead the

case, --

THE COURT: Well, let me just --
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THE COURT: Well, let me just -- MR. WOLF: -- which we're happy to do, and

take that out --

THE COURT: If the consumption of Denny's meals does not cause harm, would you still be entitled to damages?

MR. WOLF: Yes.

(Record remains on, no colloquy)

THE COURT: Isn't the -- the central focus of plaintiff's complaint that Denny's was aware of the affects of high sodium in their food products, and they refused to list the sodium content on its menu to warn the consumers of that fact. Is that true?

MR. WOLF: I wouldn't word it the way that you did, though.

THE COURT: Well, I --

MR. WOLF: That -- that's a product's

liability failure --

THE COURT: Well --

MR. WOLF: -- to warn type of argument, -- THE COURT: No, it's not. My question -- MR. WOLF: -- which is not what we made.

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1 THE COURT: -- my question, and then I want 2 you to tell me why my statement is wrong, and I'll read 3 it again, and I -- and I'll -- I'll -- tell -- I'll ask 4 you again, isn't the central focus of your complaint 5 that Denny's was aware of the affects of high sodium in 6 their food products and they refused to list the sodium 7 content in its menu to warn customers of this fact. 8 MR. WOLF: No. 9 THE COURT: Okay. How is that wrong? 10 MR. WOLF: It's -- it's not about -- the -the word warn wouldn't be in how I would phrase it. 11 12 would be a disclosure of something that's in their food 13 -- what I was trying to state before is, for example --14 THE COURT: Just tell me how that statement 15 is wrong. 16 MR. WOLF: Because it's not about warning 17 them, it's about giving them notice of information 18 that --19

THE COURT: Giving notice is warning, --MR. WOLF: Well, no, warning --

THE COURT: -- is it not?

-- invokes physical --MR. WOLF:

conceptually, thinks about harm. You --

THE COURT: Okay. So let's take it --MR. WOLF: -- warn somebody against harm.

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THE COURT: -- let's take that -- let's --This is noticing of information. MR. WOLF: THE COURT: Okay. Good. Let's take out the Isn't the central focus of your complaint word warn. that Denny's was aware of the affects of high sodium in their food products and refused to list the sodium content on its menu, to give notice to customers of this fact?

MR. WOLF: No, I would take out affects. I -- our -- our complaint is about they're aware of the high sodium content of their food and failure to tell people that there is high sodium so that they could decide whether or not they want to consume it. not about the affects --

> THE COURT: Well, then -- then I'm --

-- and it's not about warning. MR. WOLF: THE COURT: -- really confused, because your

opposition says that Denny's meals are not fit to be consumed, based on expert's conclusions.

MR. WOLF: That's not under the Consumer Fraud Act agreement, that's under the -- I -- I think that's under the -- the implied warranty agreement, an argument which Your Honor, I think, read, clearly included the fact that they didn't give limiting notice in their advertisements in selling of that.

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1 Which is the main focus of our implied 2 warranty is that they didn't include that information. 3 Not that it was -- it wasn't fit to consume for the combination. Had they told people that it had salt and 4 that level of salt, then -- then we wouldn't have our 5 6 Consumer Fraud Act claim or an implied warranty of --7 of merchantability claim, because it's based on that 8 one component, that they didn't give them fair warning of -- of -- of the content of the sodium. 9 10 THE COURT: In essence, what you're alleging 11 then is that Denny's failed to warn consumers of the high sodium in its food, which it had knowledge, 12 13 resulting in economic harm to the plaintiff, correct? 14 MR. WOLF: Yes, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: And do you agree or disagree that plaintiff's complaint alleges that sodium is dangerous, 16 17 it causes one to -- an increased risk of injury? 18 MR. WOLF: I -- I agree that we put that in 19

background information, but not to support his claims, but to --

THE COURT: That's not what I'm asking. I'm asking --

> MR. WOLF: Yes, that allegation is --THE COURT: -- do you -- do you agree?

MR. WOLF: -- in the complaint.

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THE COURT: And do you agree or disagree that the classes are -- the classic articulation of tort law duties, that is to warn of or make safe, is squarely within the theories included in the PLA? The Product's Liability Act.

MR. WOLF: The answer to your question, I think, is yes, but I don't think -- that's not what we pled here and --

THE COURT: Oh, I know it's not what you --MR. WOLF: -- what we're alleging.

THE COURT: -- pled, but it's -- it's --

That's not what we're asking for. MR. WOLF: THE COURT: -- it's -- but you agree -- but

you agree.

I -- I believe that's true, Your MR. WOLF:

Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything else you want to add?

MR. WOLF: Yeah, well, actually, just wanted to add, Footnote 49 in the McDARBY case, which I think sums up everything, and it's on Page -- I guess, 90 -starting 95.

THE COURT: You mean I didn't have to read all this and all you had to do was say to me, Footnote 49.

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1 MR. WOLF: I tried to before, Your Honor, 2 where you -- and -- and you told me to --3 THE COURT: No. 4 MR. WOLF: -- wait. I start -- I picked it 5 up and you --6 THE COURT: I would have liked to --7 MR. WOLF: -- said to wait. 8 THE COURT: -- have gotten Footnote 49 before 9 oral argument. 10 MR. WOLF: You -- you -- you --11 THE COURT: No, I -- I read McDARBY. 12 Tell me what --13 MR. WOLF: Okay. But -- but anyway, the --14 THE COURT: -- tell me what you're referring 15 to. 16 MR. WOLF: -- the point is that I didn't do all the briefing, but I was elected to do the argument. 17 18 So I did all the reading last night. So like you, Your 19 Honor, I've read this over several times. 20 THE COURT: Go ahead. MR. WOLF: And -- and I think this is -- this 21 22 is dispositive. The jury did not find that Merck 23 committed consumer fraud by using unconscionable 24 commercial practices when marketing Vioxx to 25 prescribing physicians. However, it had found that

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Merck had made misrepresent -- had the capacity to mislead concerning the cardiovascular risk. The first sentence is what really is appropriate.

We're talking about the marketing of -THE COURT: What's the first -- I -- I don't
-- I don't follow you, tell me what --

-- what's important here?

MR. WOLF: What --

THE COURT:

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MR. WOLF: The jury did not find that Merck committed consumer fraud by using unconscionable commercial practices when marketing Vioxx to prescribing physicians. However, it found that Merck had made misrepresentations that had the capacity to mislead concerning the cardiovascular risk of Vioxx, while marketing the drug to prescribing physicians and

that Merck had, intentionally, suppressed, concealed, or omitted material information about an association between Vioxx and an increased risk of cardiovascular events from prescribing physicians.

THE COURT: What does that have to do with this?

MR. WOLF: What -- what we ask -THE COURT: You're saying that there's
fraudulent concealment here?

MR. WOLF: No, no, what I -- I think it has

to do with it, Your Honor, is that, ultimately, the question becomes a jury question. What -- our complaint is strictly seeking damages based on the marketing of meals and failure to disclose something that we -- they're required to do under the Consumer Fraud Act.

If a jury believes that, then we win, and it goes to the fact finder. We're -- we're not arguing that there's anything to do with the relationship between high sodium and disease. We're arguing that they just had a duty to disclose this, under the Consumer Fraud Act, they didn't disclose it, and our client was damaged because -- under the theories of the Consumer Fraud Act.

THE COURT: And why did they have a duty to disclose?

MR. WOLF: The Consumer --

THE COURT: Because it causes harm.

MR. WOLF: -- Fraud Act --

THE COURT: Because it causes harm.

MR. WOLF: No, because the Consumer Fraud Act has a specific component, 56:8-2.9, 10, and 11, that requires them to put information on their menus to not make the food that they're selling in any respect misleading. And the fact that there's a lot of -- they

Wolf / Thorpe - Motion

don't have to cook with a lot of sodium. Many restaurants don't, but the fact that they did is prescribed by the Consumer Fraud Act.

We -- I believe we get to go to a jury to decide whether that's true or not and -- and -- and I think that footnote is instructive, because that's our claim. It's purely the marketing of Denny's products without disclosing them.

THE COURT: Okay. Very good. Counsel.

MS. THORPE: Your Honor, this is a case, as you have outlined, that contends that the sale of salt cured meats, breakfast foods, and -- and common foods, like eggs, and potatoes, and cheese, is a fraud and -- and it violates the Uniform Commercial Code.

And the -- as Your Honor correctly described our contentions in your recital, the first argument plaintiffs make is that the Product Liability Act subsumes all of the claims.

Responding to what I just heard, Your Honor, there seems to be an effort to detach the allegations regarding harm from salt from -- from the claims that they are making. And they would have no claim absent some sort of contention of a harm. So their argument fails on its face for -- for the -- from what we just heard.

The plaintiff's contentions in their briefing in opposition to our Product Liability Act argument, are that they are pleading only an economic loss. That kind of argument was, clearly, rejected by the court in -- by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the <u>SINCLAIR</u> case.

In <u>SINCLAIR</u>, the plaintiff brought a product's Liability Act claim and a Consumer Fraud Act claim, as Your Honor knows, seeking economic damages. They sought the cost of diagnostic testing. And the plaintiffs, particularly -- or the court, particularly, notes that the plaintiffs did not seek to recover damages for personal injury.

So the court dismissed the Product Liability Act claim, because on its face it requires a physical injury. And the court then went on to dismiss the Consumer Fraud Act claim, as well, noting that it was clear that the plaintiff was seeking relief for harm, that is, latent or potential heart attack.

Just like in this case, in Paragraph 28 of the complaint, where the plaintiffs clearly set out that their -- their allegation is that the -- that the salt -- that there was a failure to warn of the harms that might be caused by the salt content in Denny's food.

Thorpe - Motion

So even though plaintiffs were claiming a truly economic vantage in the <u>SINCLAIR</u> case, the court said that they could not bring a Consumer Fraud Act claim, because the sole remedy in New Jersey for such harm is the Product Liability Act.

So the Product Liability Act claim was dismissed for lack of physical injury and the Consumer Fraud Act claim was dismissed by the Product Liability Act was the sole remedy.

THE COURT: I'm familiar with that, Counsel. Why don't we -- why don't you tell me a little bit about your position in terms of the two statutes that they cite to, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.9 and 56:8-2.10, that the misrepresentation by Denny of food and menus or advertisements of eating establishments and acts constituting misrepresentation of identity of food.

MS. THORPE: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you tell me a little bit about that?

MS. THORPE: Sure. Those two statutes do not say, on their face, that, as I'm sure Your Honor is aware, that you have to disclose any particular information on your menu about food. Rather, they are identity -- they -- they -- they relate to the identity of food.

So it would be as if -- if the picture of the Moons of My Hammy that is on the menu, wasn't want the plaintiff, actually, got, that's one piece of the --the case -- of the statute. And then if there is an omission that somehow affects the identity of the food, then that, too, is prohibited.

This -- these statutes, in 2.9 and 2.10, do not say anything about affirmative information that must be conveyed in a restaurant menu. And the plaintiff's all right, at it's core, when you read the briefing, is that there is something wrong with selling french fries with a -- a sandwich that has egg and cheese on it or selling ham and eggs together. And that cannot -- that -- that that, somehow, is impacting the identity of the foods and that cannot be unlawful conduct, Your Honor.

So their argument -- I mean, there's nothing in these statutes that says what they just argued.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. WOLF: Yes, Your Honor. I just -- I just want to make a point. I mean, the fact that something, potentially, could harm somebody, is not relevant to what -- to the case that we -- we brought. I believe that we clearly stated our cause of action. I think -- and -- and we pled this case, the case of --

Wolf - Motion

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THE COURT: How about <u>IN RE: LEAD PAINT</u>.
MR. WOLF: -- <u>ELIAS VS. UNGAR'S FOODS</u>
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PRODUCT.

THE COURT: Why don't we -- why don't we look at <u>IN RE: LEAD PAINT</u>? How is this any different from <u>IN RE: LEAD PAINT</u>?

MR. WOLF: It's very different from <u>IN RE:</u>

LEAD PAINT, --

THE COURT: Tell me.

MR. WOLF: -- because we're not pleading any harm or -- or any -- we're strictly talking about the --

THE COURT: Well, <u>IN RE: LEAD PAINT</u> didn't claim it, they claim nuisance, but the court found that it was, really, acted as a harm under the Product's Liability Act, no?

MR. WOLF: They did. I -- I --

THE COURT: So how -- how is this --

MR. WOLF: -- skimmed through and that -- IN

RE: LEAD PAINT.

THE COURT: -- well, <u>IN RE: LEAD PAINT</u> is --

MR. WOLF: So I didn't --

THE COURT: -- is probably something you

should have done more than skim, --

MR. WOLF: Well, I relied on my --

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1 THE COURT: -- because it's -- it's an 2 important case. 3 MR. WOLF: -- my co-counsel for that, but I 4 -- I read on the cases that -- I did read SINCLAIR and McDARBY, and I read -- and -- and it was abatement of 5 6 the purchase price case, if I remember. 7 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to tell you --8 MR. WOLF: Yeah, but -- but --9 THE COURT: -- what it was, if you want to 10 add something, you can add something. 11

MR. WOLF: Right, but -- but --I -- I've read it. THE COURT:

MR. WOLF: The -- I guess the point -- IN RE: LEAD PAINT, SINCLAIR, and McDARBY are inapposite to the claims in this case, and that's why I wanted to just bring to the Court's attention the <u>UNGAR</u> case. was about mislabeling of calorie and fat -- fat content.

I know it's a District Court of New Jersey case, but that case, one could make the same arguments. Who cares about calories and who cares about fat? Having too much fat is -- potentially, can cause harm to people. Eating more calories than you want is, potentially, cause harm to people, but what they did is, they misrepresented the calorie -- the caloric and

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the fat content in their products, and it's a Consumer Fraud Act case, it's a misrepresentation.

And in this case, our argument is the same as It -- it has nothing to do with the fact that salt can, potentially, cause harm to people. It's the fact that there's huge amounts of salt in these projects -- products, that they know is in -- and that under the Consumer Fraud Act, they're required to do it.

The same way if they used Splenda in their ice tea instead of sugar. They have -- that -- that's -- it -- it makes it sweet. People don't know that it has Splenda or sugar, but if they use Splenda, they're required to disclose that. That would be some type of It may, potentially, cause harm to somebody that has an allergic reaction to that, but it's the marketing and the failure to disclose materials parts of products.

It's the same as when they serve sour cream on the side, that they use imitation sour cream that had some chemicals in it. They would be required to disclose, on their menu, that they were using imitation sour cream and not just say sour cream.

It -- it's --it's about the marketing of the product and the failure to disclose information that

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about. It has nothing to do with the potential harm.

THE COURT: I understand. Okay. Pursuant to Rule 462E, a party may file a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in lieu of an answer. Plaintiff's allegation should be examined using a generous and hospitable approach that draws every reasonable inference in favor of plaintiff. And that's LEON VS. RITE AID, 340 NJ Super 462 at 466, ApDiv 2001.

they know, that they just don't want to tell people

The complaint must be searched in-depth and with liberality to determine if a cause of action can be gleaned, even from an obscure statement, particularly, if further discovery is taken. Every reasonable inference is, therefore, afforded to plaintiff and the motion granted only in rare instances and, ordinarily, without prejudice. And that's the PRINTING MART case at 116 NJ 739 at 746.

Moreover, a complaint should not be dismissed under this rule where a cause of action is suggested by the facts and a theory of actionability may be articulated by amendments of the complaint. Defendants assert that even if the facts alleged in plaintiff's complaint are true, plaintiff has failed to plead a cognizable cause of action.

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The first issue that the Court must decide is whether plaintiff's claims are subsumed by the New Jersey Product's Liability Act, which I'm going to refer to as the PLA. Denny's contends that plaintiff's claims are subsumed by the PLA, as they are, actually, product's liability failure to warn claims brought under the guise of the Consumer Fraud Act, which I'm going to refer to as the CFA.

Plaintiff argues that since he did not allege either a personal injury or increase risk of injury, necessitating tort damages, but rather, he sustained economic losses based on his purchase of these meals, Denny's PLA argument is baseless.

In 1987, the legislature enacted the PLA based on an urgent need for remedial legislation to establish clear rules with respect to certain matters relating to actions for damages for harm caused by products. And that's N.J.S.A. 2A 58C-1A.

Shortly after the PLA was enacted, the New Jersey Supreme Court declared that the legislature intended to limit the liability of manufacturers so as to balance the interests of the public and the individual with a view toward economic reality. And that's ZAZA VS. MARGUESS, 144 NJ 34 at 47-48, quoting SHACKIL, 116 NJ 155 at 188.

Product's liability action is defined as any claim or action brought by a claimant for harm caused by a product, irrespective of theory underlying the claim, except actions for harm caused by breach of the express warranty. And that's N.J.S.A. 2A 58C-1B3. Accordingly, the PLA is the exclusive remedy for harms caused by a product.

The Supreme Court decision in <u>IN RE: LEAD</u> <u>PAINT</u>, 191 NJ 405, 2007, which is recently relied upon by the Court in <u>SINCLAIR VS. MERCK</u>, 104 NJ 51, 2008, is determinative of whether plaintiff's CFA claim is barred by the PLA. In <u>LEAD PAINT</u>, 26 municipalities and counties sought to recover from manufactures and distributors of lead paints, the cost of detecting or removing lead paint from homes and buildings, providing medical care to residents affected with lead poisoning, and developing programs to educate residents about the dangers of lead paint. And that's at 408, 409.

Although the complaints initially sought recovery through a wide variety of legal theories, the court was called upon to consider only whether the plaintiff had stated a conscionable -- a cognizable claim, based on the common law tort of public nuisance.

The Supreme Court held that the PLA encompasses, virtually, all possible causes of action

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related to harms caused by consumers and -- by consumer and other products. And that's at Page 436 and 437.

The essence of the claims asserted by the plaintiff in <u>LEAD PAINT</u> was that the defendant failed to warn of the dangers of lead paint. Thus, plaintiffs' exclusive remedy is the PLA. And that's at 437. The court noted that harms plaintiff was seeking to vindicate are addressed in the context of a product's liability claim.

"Were there any doubt about the essential nature of the claims asserted by plaintiffs, a careful reading would demonstrate that they sound in product's liability causes of action. The central focus of plaintiffs' complaints is that defendants were aware of dangers associated with lead and by extension, with the dangers of including it in paint intended to be used in homes and businesses, and failed to warn of those dangers.

"It's classic articulation of tort law duties, that is, to warn of or to make safe squarely within the theories included in the PLA. In light of the clear intention of our legislature to include all such claims within the scope of the PLA, we find no ground on which to concede -- which to conclude," rather, "that the claims being raised by plaintiffs

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regarding an ordinary household product, used by consumers, were excluded from the scope of that act." And that's at Page 437.

Similarly, in the McDARBY VS. MERCK, the Appellate Division relied upon <u>LEAD PAINT</u> to vacate -- to vacate an award of out-of-pocket expenses, treble damages, vis a vis the CFA, because the plaintiff's PLA claims subsumed their CFA claims.

With McDARBY involved an appeal from a 15.7 million judgment on claims of product liability and consumer fraud arising from Merck's sale of a prescription drug -- prescription drug Vioxx. The plaintiffs were able to recover additional economic loss pursuant to CFA as a result of Merck's alleged unconscionable commercial practices, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing concealments of pressure or omission of a material fact, with intent that others rely upon such concealments of pressure or omission. That's at 96.

In overturning the award, the <u>McDARBY</u> court observed that, "As in <u>LEAD PAINT</u>, plaintiffs' own arguments make it clear that what they are asserting is at it's core, that Merck failed to warn of dangers from a product, which it had knowledge, resulting in alleged economic harm to them." And that's at Page 97.

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The court further noted that the, "Essential effect of recognition of a cause of action for the fraudulent withholding of safety information, such as that espoused by plaintiffs pursuant to the CFA, a cause of action that likely would be available to most product liability plaintiffs claiming a failure to warn would be to permit an award of attorneys fees in the majority of product liability actions, without legislative authorization for such relief. We find no warrant for such action." And that's at Page 98.

Shortly after McDARBY, the New Jersey Supreme Court, again, addressed the issue of whether the CFA is subsumed by the PLA in SINCLAIR VS. MERCK, 105 NJ 51, that's 2008. In SINCLAIR, the court found that the plaintiff sought to avoid the requirements of the PLA by asserting their claims as CFA claims. And that's 195 NJ at 54.

SINCLAIR was a product's liability action in which the plaintiff sought to recover the costs of medical monitoring without alleging a physical injury. The court concluded that "The language of the PLA represents a clear legislative intent that despite the broad reach we give to the CFA, the PLA is paramount when the underlying claim is one for harm caused by a product.

"The heart of plaintiff's case is the potential for harm caused by Merck's drug. It is, honestly, a product's liability claim. Plaintiff's CFA claim does not fall within an exception to the PLA, but rather, clearly falls within its scope. Consequently, plaintiffs may not maintain a CFA claim." And that's at Page 66.

In this case, plaintiffs seek class-wide injunctive relief under the CFA and economic losses equal to the amount of money he spent on those meals, that he would not have purchased had the sodium content been properly disclosed to him. Plaintiff further asserts in his opposing papers that he did not suffer any personal injury or increased risk of physical injury by ingesting foods containing "astronomical" levels of sodium in Denny's meal.

So plaintiff's complaint sets forth that,
Number 1, "Sodium is the deadliest ingredient in food
supply." And that's the complaint at Paragraph 7.
Number 2, "Epidemiologists have found that
populations that consume high levels of sodium suffer

high rates of hypertension." And that's Paragraph 8 of the complaint.

Number 3, "Experts estimate that reducing sodium levels in processed and restaurant foods by 50

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percent would save 150,000 lives each year." And that's the complaint at Paragraph 12.

Number 4, "Excessive sodium intake," poses a "grave harm." And that's the complaint at Paragraph 21.

Number 5, plaintiff, "Has hypertension." He takes medication, "To treat his hypertension and high blood pressure." He is aware, "That he should be on a low sodium diet if he watches his salt intake." And that's complaint Paragraph 29.

Number 6, plaintiff "Would not have purchased Moons over My Hammy or any other high sodium meal if the menu had fully stated the sodium content." At Paragraph 31.

And Number 7, "The amount of sodium in a typical Denny's meal is extraordinarily high, 75 percent of Denny's meals contain more than the maximum amount of sodium most American adults should consume in an entire day." And that's complaint Paragraph 18.

Thus, plaintiff's assertion to the contrary, his complaint is replete with allegations that sodium is dangerous and that it causes increased risk of physical injury.

Further, a close reading of plaintiff's complaint reveals that the central nature of

plaintiff's allegations is that despite having knowledge of the detrimental effects of excessive sodium, Denny's continues to market meals containing excessive sodium.

In other words, Denny's has misrepresented the safety of its product by failing to warn plaintiffs of its dangers. It did -- plaintiff, specifically, alleges, "Despite knowledge of the great harm that excessive sodium intake, Denny's continues to market meals filled with excessive sodium." And that's complaint Paragraph 21.

In addition, plaintiff alleges that the information that Denny's does provide regarding the levels of sodium in its meals is inadequate. Paragraph 22 of the complaint states, "Denny's may argue that it does provide nutrition information to New Jersey consumers. However, the information is only available on-line or in pamphlets at a few restaurants where New Jersey consumers must ask for the pamphlets."

This classic articulation of tort law duties, that is, to warn or to make safe is squarely within the theories included in the PLA. And that's <u>LEAD PAINT</u>, 191 NJ at 437.

Further, because the core of plaintiff's complaint is that defendant's failed to adequately warn

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the consumers of the dangerous levels of sodium in its meals, plaintiff's remedy appears to be that in a PLA. At least that's in his -- from my reading of plaintiff's complaint.

Plaintiff argues at length that the instant case is distinguishable from <u>SINCLAIR</u> and <u>McDARBY</u> because both cases involve claims by persons who ingested the prescription drug Vioxx and then asserted claims based on the actual or increased risk of physical injury suffered as a result of ingesting Vioxx.

Plaintiff contends that because he seeks relief based solely upon economic losses he sustained in purchasing, rather than consuming Denny's meals, the CFA should not be subsumed by the PLA. In support of this position, plaintiff relies on three cases; IN RE: FORD MOTOR COMPANY, which is 66 UCC Reporter Server 2nd 726. ESTATE OF EDWARD KNOSTER, 200 Fed Appx 106 at 116. And STRAWN VS. CANUSO, which is 140 NJ at 43. Each of these cases, this Court finds, is distinguishable from the present case.

In <u>IN RE: FORD MOTOR</u>, involved a consolidated action seeking recovery related to the diminution in value of an automobile. Ford asserted that the New Jersey plaintiff's warranty claims should

be dismissed for failure to allege actual injury. <u>IN</u>
<u>RE: FORD MOTOR</u> at 44 and 45. In a footnote, the
district court observed that the New Jersey Supreme
Court in -- in <u>SINCLAIR</u>, "Dismissed the product's
liability claim for failure to allege a physical
injury, as required by the statute."

Here, plaintiffs do not pursue a PLA claim, in part, because by design, the PLA accepts actions for harms caused by breach of an express warranty, which plaintiffs expressly allege. Thus, in <u>IN RE: FORD MOTOR</u>, the court, itself, acknowledged <u>SINCLAIR</u> was distinguishable, because the plaintiffs did not pursue a PLA claim, since an action for breach of express warranty is explicitly exempted.

Here, however, plaintiff's CFA claims and breach of implied warranty of merchantability are not expressly exempted.

Plaintiff further relies on the <u>DRISSHER</u> (phonetic) court's observations, included in the same footnote, that the, "<u>SINCLAIR's</u> court also does not mandate dismissal of unjust enrichment in state consumer fraud claims where a party does not plead a PLA claim."

However, the plaintiff in <u>SINCLAIR</u> did include a PLA claim. The <u>SINCLAIR</u> court, ultimately,

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rejected the plaintiff's attempt to recover medical maintenance damages, holding that medical maintenance damages do not constitute physical injuries under the PLA and that the PLA subsumed plaintiff's CFA claims.

To the extent that <u>IN RE: FORD</u> court suggests that <u>SINCLAIR</u> stands for the opposite proposition, that if plaintiff does not explicitly plead a PLA claim and assert a claim under the CFA. This Court is not bound by dicta contained in a New -- New Jersey district court opinion.

The <u>ESTATE OF EDWARD KNOSTER</u> is also inapposite to this case. The <u>ESTATE OF EDWARD KNOSTER</u> involves a car accident that resulted in the death of Mr. Knoster. Plaintiff's brought a failure to warn of a design claim under the PLA and an additional claim under the CFA to recover damages to the car, itself.

The Third Circuit noted that although the PLA, "Effectively creates an exclusive statutory cause of action for claims falling within its purview, claims for physical damage to the product, itself, are not product's liability actions, because the PLA, specifically, excludes such damage from its definition of harm." And that's at 200 Fed X -- Fed Appx at 115-16. And that cites N.J.S.A. 58C-1B2.

Here, plaintiff does not allege damage to the

meals he purchased at Denny's. Therefore, plaintiff's claims do not fall within the exception relied upon by the <u>ESTATE OF EDWARD KNOSTER</u>.

Finally, plaintiff relies on the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion in <u>STRAWN VS. CANUSO</u>, arguing that plaintiff's claim should survive because, like the plaintiff in <u>STRAWN</u>, he is alleging that a seller concealed material information about a product's health and safety impact on the product's marketability.

Plaintiff contends that under the theory advanced by Denny's, <u>STRAWN's</u> would have been decided differently. However, <u>STRAWN</u>, which addressed the developer's duty to disclose a potential buyer the existence of a nearby hazardous landfill, did not involve a product -- within the meaning of PLA. And the court refers to <u>DEAN VS. BARRETT HOMES</u>, ApDiv 2009.

It was Judge Sabatino's concurring opinion where he states, "I have considered -- I have considerable doubt that the legislature intended to treat a single family house as a product when it enacted the PLA."

Moreover, assuming that real estate is a product under the PLA, <u>STRAWN</u> was decided pre-<u>LEAD</u> <u>PAINT</u>, pre-<u>McDARBY</u>, and pre-<u>SINCLAIR</u>, and, therefore, it does not address the main issue before the Court,

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that is, whether the PLA subsumes plaintiff's CFA claims.

Ultimately, the Court is not persuaded by the legal authorities cited by plaintiff to support his position that, "The PLA has nothing to do with this case," and that's a quote. Although McDARBY and SINCLAIR involve -- involve claims under both the PLA and the CFA, the Court finds no reason to limit those holdings to cases involving actions brought under both theories.

Moreover, the <u>LEAD PAINT</u> court found that plaintiff's nuisance claim was subsumed by the PLA, despite the fact that plaintiff did not include an underlying PLA count. And that's at 191 NJ at 409, 436-439.

Those holdings are consistent with the PLA, which defines a product's liability action to include harms caused by products, "Irrespective of the theory underlying the claim." N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1B3.

Although neither party addresses the issue, PLA, clearly, subsumes the implied warranty of merchantability, as set forth in the UCC, KOSTER VS. SCOTCH ASSOCIATES, 273 NJ Super 102 at 110. Citing TIRRELL VS. NAVISTAR, 248 NJ Super 390 at 398, N.J.S.A. 58C 1 3.

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The PLA no longer recognizes negligence or a breach of warranty, with the exception of express warranty, as a viable, separate claim for harm. This is defined in the act caused by a defective product. That's <u>TIRRELL</u>, 248 NJ Super at 398.

Under the PLA, harm is defined as personal, physical illness, injury, or death. N.J.S.A. 2A 58C-1B2. Again, the PLA defines a product liability action to include harms caused by products irrespective of the theory underlying the claim. That's N.J.S.A. 2A 58C-13B.

Here, the allegations that support plaintiff's breach of implied warranty of merchantability claim are that an ordinary consumer will not reasonably expect to encounter excessive amounts of sodium. That's Paragraph 58 of plaintiff's complaint.

Again, however, the essence of this allegation is that the excessive sodium is harmful. Indeed, in his opposition papers, plaintiff argues that, "Denny's meals are not fit to be consumed and, therefore, unmerchantable, because Denny's meals that contain thousands of milligrams of sodium contribute to the epidemic of hypertension and these meals contribute to a risk factor for preventable death." And that's,

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actually, a quote, and that's taken from Page 25 of plaintiff's brief.

Plaintiff then goes on to include a litary of organizations that, purportedly, include that high amounts of sodium in food, such as the high amounts of sodium in Denny's meals, can lead to hypertension.

Accordingly, as with plaintiff's CFA claim, plaintiff's implied warranty of merchantability, essentially, alleges harms that are subsumed by the PLA.

In sum, an indulgent and meticulous examination of plaintiff's complaint reveals that plaintiff's underlying claim is that Denny's failed to warn plaintiff that its meals contain unreasonably high levels of sodium.

I do note, and I mentioned this during the course of oral argument, that there is pending legislation before Congress that addresses this issues, specifically, the proposed Meal Act would require the menus include the following information, adjacent to the list of food items; calories, saturated fat, and trans fat, sodium, and percentage daily value. In addition, the bill would preempt state and local requirements that are in conflict with the federal legislation, but expressly authorize the state and

local authorities to impose further requirements. And that's HR 2426, which is available at government tracked U.S. Congress.

And I know, although it's not binding on this Court, the resolution is indicative of a policy debate that's currently taking place within the federal government. Although, that has no bearing on this Court's determination and how I'm ruling on this motion.

All of Denny's acts that plaintiff alleges in his complaint give rise to his CFA and implied warranty of merchantability claims, in reality, are grounded exclusively in product's liability theories and the Court relies on IN RE: LEAD PAINT, 191 NJ at 411, to allow plaintiff to proceed with such claims, because plaintiff declined to include a PLA count, would elevate the form over substance and frustrate the mandate of the PLA.

For all those reasons, the facts, as alleged in plaintiff's second amended complaint, are insufficient to state claims pursuant to Rule 462E. Plaintiff's complaint is, thereby, dismissed without prejudice to let plaintiff file an amended complaint, if he deems to do so, within 30 days. If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within 30 days of

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today's date, the Court will, thereafter, on its on motion, convert the dismissal without prejudice to a dismissal with prejudice.

Anything else?

MR. WOLF: No, Your Honor, thank you very

much.

THE COURT: Okay. We'll get you a copy of the order.

MS. HANDLER: Thanks.

THE COURT: Thanks. Do I have the order or do you have the order? I don't know. I had a bunch of papers and a disk, too. We'll get that to you in -- just give us two minutes. I just have to locate it.

(Unrelated matter discussed) (Proceedings concluded)

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<u>CERTIFICATION</u>

I, Susan M. Cawley, the assigned transcriber, do hereby certify the foregoing transcript of proceedings at the Middlesex County Superior Court, on November 10, 2009, Tape No, 1, Index No. from 0024 to 4325, is prepared in full compliance with the current Transcript Format for Judicial Proceedings and is a true and accurate compressed transcript to the best of my knowledge and ability.

Susan M. Cawley

AD/T 427 AOC Number

<u>KLJ Transcription Service</u> Agency November 19, 2009 Date